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IRRs work really well in a 12-year bull market but VCs have to make money in good markets and bad. For Upfront Ventures, across > 25 years of investing in any given fund 5–8 investments will return more than 80% of all distributions and it’s generally out of 30–40 investments. It’s just math. So it’s about 20%.
The top quartile has distributed 2.03x (vs. 1.68) and the median fund now has distributed 1.27X (vs. The longer the portfolio maintains the same value without distributing back cash, the worse the fund’s ultimate IRR. Based on that metric, the top quartile fund has now distributed 2.03X after 12 years.
Unfortunately as we’ve learned from recent experience, using Return on Net Assets and IRR as proxies for efficiency and execution won’t save a company when their industry encounters creative disruption. For example, Coke added snack foods, which could be distributed through its existing distribution channels.
One industry specific example is the strange fascination among some LPs and GPs around term IRR. Even though everyone knows that VC funds take 10+ years to come to fruition, one often can’t help but benchmark themselves based on IRR in the early days.
One industry specific example is the strange fascination among some LPs and GPs around term IRR. Even though everyone knows that VC funds take 10+ years to come to fruition, one often can’t help but benchmark themselves based on IRR in the early days.
One industry specific example is the strange fascination among some LPs and GPs around term IRR. Even though everyone knows that VC funds take 10+ years to come to fruition, one often can’t help but benchmark themselves based on IRR in the early days.
I’m observing that IRR is a metric that is becoming an increasing focus in venture, replacing fund return multiple as the key metric of success. I understand the draw of IRR, and – as a fund draws to a close – there’s no question it’s an important metric. Recycling hurts IRR. This is a mistake.
Flexible VC creates early liquidity which can be either reinvested or distributed to LPs. This causes the cost of capital for Flexible VC, often calculated through IRR (similar to an interest rate), can be higher than that of venture debt or traditional RBI. 20-30% is a common target IRR for investors. Early liquidity.
If you look at the spreadsheet, you will see that the “Required Rate of Return” is expressed as an IRR. Internal Rates of Return naturally compound, so a 50% IRR is 7.59 (If you plug in an IRR of 58.5% Internal Rates of Return naturally compound, so a 50% IRR is 7.59 times at 5 years and 11.39
3x the invested capital net of fees over a period of about ten years for a net IRR in the low twenties). Note: TVPI stands for total value of investments net of fees / invested capital; DPI stands for distributions (= cash to LP’s) / invested capital). The chart below shows the numbers as of June 30, 2021. . .
This may not hurt the ultimate exit value of these companies, but the passage of time will hurt the fund’s ultimate IRR. Unevenly distributed, but broadly optimistic. As you can tell from my first two points, the effects of Covid have been quite unevenly distributed within a VC portfolio. Reshuffling the deck.
It’s a generalization but one that’s pretty well accepted in venture circles and it’s how many VCs describe target fund distribution, myself included. Correlation Ventures just released a study that shows the distribution of outcomes across over 21,000 financings and spanning the years 20014-2013. But does this heuristic match reality?
It’s a generalization but one that’s pretty well accepted in venture circles and it’s how many VCs describe target fund distribution, myself included. Correlation Ventures just released a study that shows the distribution of outcomes across over 21,000 financings and spanning the years 20014-2013. But does this heuristic match reality?
As you can see from the chart their data suggests there are about $25 billion of VC distributions per year in the US. The better way to think about VC returns is, do the firms consistently beat alternative asset clases on an IRR basis to adjust for the increased risk and lack of liquidity? The top 2% do not drive 98% of the returns.
Distributions can actually be drawn out over an extended period of time, but for the purposes of this exercise, I just kept the fund to 11 years. If you're following on in the A round, then you shed a full 500 basis points on your IRR. Time is the enemy of IRR. It's what you'd expect. That's if you're not following on.
Partnerships getting hit the hardest: those without some recent distributions (some are rumored to have nothing in the past 7-9 years!), those with no previous funds beating T-bill IRRs (or even showing a positive return), and those with heavy university endowment LPs (which have gotten slammed).
As Bill points out, many funds are sitting on huge paper gains which translate into large TVPI, MOC, gross IRR, or whatever the current trendy way to measure things are. However, the DPI is the interesting number from a real perspective.
Do you feel the need to raise more capital quickly before the prices erode further and bring down your IRR? Cash distributions are what matter at the end of the day, bug big paper gains still make for good fundraising pitches. Even though you know this may be bad for the company in the long run? LIMITED PARTNERS (LPS).
Leaders (company is leaving China, our IPO is next week, 1,800 new stores are being opened in 180 days, our new IRR is 8%). And you also have, perhaps more useful, the industry wide acquisition strategy distribution. Any big shifts in investment (marketing, customer experience, team sizes, tools). And other such things.
No reason to sell winners prematurely just because of original fund length, especially given our LPs are largely cash-on-cash return focused more than IRR. Exceeding our limits on company concentration and recycling – we are aggressive in using early liquidity to get more turns on the dollars rather than distribute.
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