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Another firm we saw tried to raise $15 million at a $60 million pre-money with similar metrics. They did an inside round, spent a bunch of money and then went through a fire sale of the business less than 2 years later. But he sold within 3 years for not a huge price after having raised more than $20 million. Here’s the problem.
Him: But when I raised my first round we didn’t know how to price the company. There were no metrics. How will you price the next round? Your A round? Him: On metrics. In finance they call it “terminal value” but the truth is the price is as arbitrary at your A round as it is at your seed round.
The critical metrics for each stage of your SaaS business | by Lars Lofrgren – [link]. The Damaging Psychology of DownRounds | by Mark Suster – [link]. It’s difficult to fake corporate culture | Business Insider – [link]. 10 Myths about Startups – [link]. Why do we worry about scalability on Day 1?
If you do a $1 million angel round at $6 million pre-money and hope to do a Series A round for $2-3 million that’s fine as long as you’re doing awesome against your metric goals and the market continues to be frothy. If either condition doesn’t hold it will be hard to do anything but a flat or downround.
Him: But when I raised my first round we didn’t know how to price the company. There were no metrics. How will you price the next round? Your A round? Him: On metrics. In finance they call it “terminal value” but the truth is the price is as arbitrary at your A round as it is at your seed round.
Also, they have a strong belief that any sign of weakness (such as a downround) will have a catastrophic impact on their culture, hiring process, and ability to retain employees. Their own ego is also a factor – will a downround signal weakness? A downround is nothing. Get over it and move on.
The burden [should] just be that we care; that if we learn something, we improve it, and that we don’t only use single output metrics and its growth at all costs. And I made a decision not to do an equity round, because I thought it would be a downround. We’ve kind of designed the kind of growth that we want.
Yes, you heard me right – multiple research studies, including from the Kauffman Foundation , have shown that when you remove a follow-on venture capital round from a founder or angel investor-funded company, that expected returns skyrocket. It is driven by the following: • The Best Metric for the Health of a Company is Cash Flow.
There are a lot of people that artificially group together performance metrics for venture, and try to extrapolate successful stratagies from it. Here are the top things I hear about follow ons and why they don't make a lot of sense to me: 1) You need to have follow on capital to protect your investments in case of a downround.
Also, they have a strong belief that any sign of weakness (such as a downround) will have a catastrophic impact on their culture, hiring process, and ability to retain employees. Their own ego is also a factor – will a downround signal weakness?
The burden [should] just be that we care; that if we learn something, we improve it, and that we don’t only use single output metrics and its growth at all costs. And I made a decision not to do an equity round, because I thought it would be a downround. We’ve kind of designed the kind of growth that we want.
And so the other reason that I am very interested in delving deep into this space is that it seems like IPOs like Workday, Palo Alto Networks are sort of — they have metrics and analytics that Wall Street understands, more so than a Facebook; like “We are going to sell X number of this in the next year.”
Some will demonstrate strategically justifiable metrics and have fantastic ‘up round’ exits; others may see liquidation preferences kick in which will negatively impact founders and employees; others may fulfill the adage “IPO is the new downround” , which has been the case for more than half of the public companies on our list.
The situation I see time and again is an over-valuation on a markedly smaller-than-anticipated business, revenue numbers not achieved, and then needing to do another raise on a lower valuation (a ‘down-round’). A simple metric – when I registered my first company in 2004, the naming space was wide open.
Likely signs of a Value investment: the company has challenges in filling out the round; the investors have more negotiating leverage than the founders during the closing process; the company has significantly better metrics (e.g. You could argue that when they were [raising] oversubscribed [VC rounds], Facebook, Google, Amazon, etc.,
Where I think funds do start having hard conversations around follow-ons is when they need to lead inside rounds or protect themselves in downrounds. This might not be true of all VC funds, and I know a number of funds that have a mantra that they treat follow-on rounds like “a new deal”.
Downrounds are coming. When looking at high growth public software companies, you’ll want to compare your ARR valuation multiple to their revenue valuation multiples because of its availability as a GAAP accounting metric. Source: Pitchbook NVCA Venture Monitor. Justin Kahl, David George , A16Z. Multiples by vertical.
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