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We had nascent revenues, ridiculous cost structures and unrealistic valuations. Within 5 years I was on the board of real businesses with meaningful revenue, strong balance sheets, no debt and on the path to a few interesting exits. Until we weren’t. 2001–2007: THE BUILDING YEARS The dot com bubble had burst. The tide has gone out.
I've talked about this topic before in How Investors Think About Valuation of Pre-Revenue Startups. Of course, to be able to use this kind of formula, you will need to be able to determine how much impact the person will have and figure out a valuation. Same Value for Sweat Equity as Investment Dollars? million.
We should end the year with a few million in fully recurring revenue and we’re projected to double next year. But more spend = more viral opps = more revenue down the road. >50% of our revenue in now viral. I took money with a 3x participating preferredliquidationpreference with 8% compounded interest annually.
How They Make Money: Majority of Kayak’s revenue actually comes from advertising on their site (55%), not lead generation or referral fees to travel suppliers as you might think (more on this below). Financial Snapshot: 2010 Revenue: $170 million. Revenue growth: 51% YoY (2010), 1% YoY (2009), 131% YoY (2008).
As I’ve highlighted I believe we’re in a unique period similar to 2005-08 where the biggest tech firms of Silicon Valley (and some media companies) are scooping up small software companies as “talent acquisitions&# versus accretive revenue / profit generators. So know that going in.
For the first few years, your VCs want you to keep your head down, build the product, find product/market fit and ship to get to some inflection point (revenue, users, etc.). For example, in your industry do companies build value the old fashion way by generating revenue? If so, how is the revenue measured? FDA approvals?
By contrast, venture capital and angel investments normally take the form of Preferred Stock with rights and preferences set forth in the company’s Certificate of Incorporation and other governance documents.
At an accelerator … Me: Raising convertible notes as a seed round is one of the biggest disservices our industry has done to entrepreneurs since 2001-2003 when there were “full ratchets” and “multiple liquidationpreferences” – the most hostile terms anybody found in term sheets 10 years ago.
That means that the likely have a minimum of $15 million in liquidationpreferences. It will usually be higher because the liquidationpreference has a dividend so if the deal is long in the tooth assume that the liquidationpreference might be $20-22 million. Take liquidationpreferences head on.
Some LPs have privately speculated that later-stage VCs may have a field day in the next 18 months, buying up large positions in firms with strong revenue at attractive prices given the recent squeeze on funding. But of course, for every angle of the market where one person sees caution, another spots opportunities.
If you raised $10 million at a $40 million pre-money on a company with limited revenue and if your investors are telling you that they’re concerned about your future because they doubt that outsiders will fund you at your current performance level then I would be more cautious with my burn rate – even if it means slashing costs.
3] However, if they are built bottom up, they demonstrate and make explicit a range of business model assumptions the entrepreneur is using to think about his business and its revenue model. Second a liquidationpreference and a participation. This is why a bottom up approach is more credible. First , dividends.
BTW, this ignores liquidationpreferences which actually mean you’ll earn less. So when the Stanford MBA, the ex senior technology developer or the former Chief Revenue Officer of a company is calling me and asking my advice on their next gig you can see why I start with “are you ready to earn or to learn?&#.
We talked about LiquidationPreference, Voting Rights, and all of the other valuable terms crowd-funding investors don’t understand. ” No royalty paid until there is revenue. Neither does Clayton. I think I’ll save a deep dive on this topic for another post. Then there is a royalty rate.
As a result, a “late-stage” financing is no longer reserved for high-revenue, pre-profitability companies getting ready for an IPO; it is simply any large round of financing done at a high price. You must subtract it from your top-line revenue. You should not pay a net revenue multiple for a gross revenue disclosure.
The don’t understand VC liquidationpreferences or multiple return expectations. Sure, our revenue is growing, but is that enough to raise an internal round? There are merger discussions, board debates, product miscues, revenue misses and a litany of delicate topics. They see the dollar signs and the victory.
Me: Raising convertible notes as a seed round is one of the biggest disservices our industry has done to entrepreneurs since 2001-2003 when there were “full ratchets” and “multiple liquidationpreferences” – the most hostile terms anybody found in term sheets 10 years ago. Revenue multiple? How will you price the next round?
Otherwise the investors won’t make the multiple on their investment that they want and after liquidationpreferences are paid the amount left for the entrepreneur may well also be disappointing. Company exits for £20m having raised £15m for 50% of the company in a 1x liquidationpreference – the investor gets £17.5m
In my own portfolio I have companies that are generally perceived to be extremely successful with high profile customers and lots of sales…but they just happen to have a liquidationpreference ladder of $25 million!
As the check size increases, investors tend to look for more traction, established revenue models, proven unit-economics, and other metrics that were previously associated with later stage companies. In the 80s and 90s a company would go public when it hit $20M in revenue.
Or should they look to one of the new wave of Revenue-Based Investors? Revenue-Based Investing (“RBI”) is a new form of VC financing, distinct from the preferred equity structure most VCs use. For more background, see Revenue-Based Investing: A New Option for Founders who Care About Control. But should they?
With this capital, the company propels itself to $50 million+ in revenues, and to either a sale to a strategic acquirer or to an initial public offering. This venture capital financing - usually between $3 and $10 million - is the first of a number of rounds of outside investment over a period of three to five years.
A high performing, high-growth SAAS company that may have been worth 10 or more times revenue was suddenly worth 4-7 times revenue. This is because these companies have raised so much capital that the early investor is no longer a substantial portion of the voting rights or the liquidationpreference stack.
Some will demonstrate strategically justifiable metrics and have fantastic ‘up round’ exits; others may see liquidationpreferences kick in which will negatively impact founders and employees; others may fulfill the adage “IPO is the new down round” , which has been the case for more than half of the public companies on our list.
Let’s say a given company has raised $15mm in VC funding and is generating about $3mm in revenue and starting to ramp up quickly. Furthermore, it is in an industry where M&A transactions typically happen in the 3-4X revenue range. Tough to argue that it is not reasonable. Worth some thought and discussion.
What this means, is that he gets paid not as a portion of the profit, but as a portion of the overall revenue, regardless of the profit. That’s because preferred shares operate under a completely separate set of rules (which will be defined in the investment documents) than your shares. Liquidationpreference.
Overestimating future revenue. Founders should pay attention to the liquidationpreference in the term sheet to ensure it does not become detrimental to them in a less than favorable exit. . “Setting too high a valuation during a funding round can set you up for failure.” See Also: Rejected by Investors?
forward revenue for SaaS businesses when in the years before it had been less than 5x. Or down rounds might favor earlier-stage investors because the liquidationpreferences of later stage investors get reduced. As I’ve pointed out previously, this is perfectly captured by Joe Floyd here tracking SaaS multiples over time.
If this is the case, you may find yourself starting all over with little revenue (if any), a 1-2 person team that might be consulting on the side to pay bills, and no marketing spend. As a bootstrapper, you have nobody above you on the cap table (note: investors sit above you in their liquidationpreference), so it’s your way or the highway.
from David Dalka - Creating Revenue and Retention - Chicago GSB MBA As discussed in my recent post about a TiE event on Chicago start ups, there are many factors to consider when taking in funding and employees. Posted by: Jason | August 12, 2007 at 01:23 AM really great post don. Venture Capital investing is extremely risky.
One Million by One Million is a global initiative that aims to nurture a million entrepreneurs reach a million dollars each in annual revenue and beyond by 2020, thereby creating a trillion dollars in global GDP and ten million jobs. 1M/1M Program has a bold mission. This is where numerous ventures fail.
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